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Abstract 
There is already agreement that countries do not emerge in straightforward 
transitions from authoritarian rule to multi-party democracy. Yet, we find less 
consensus on how and why democratic institutions, practices and values 
become entrenched and accepted. This owes much to the fact that two 
approaches broadly frame the analysis of democratization, namely structural 
and actor-centric. Each approach carries with it different assumptions about the 
dynamics of regime change. As a result, scholarly interpretations reflect a 
tension between how we frame democratization and the conclusions we arrive 
at. This makes it increasingly difficult to grasp the ambiguous institutional 
outcomes of recent advances. The following article addresses the challenge of 
relating ambiguity to the study of democratization. Firstly, rather than neglect 
the key insights on transition and consolidation provided by the two above 
approaches, this article offers a complimentary critique of them. Suitably 
equipped with directions from the extant literature, it proceeds to outline a 
conceptual framework for mapping ambiguous post-authoritarian settlements.  
 
 
Introduction 
The future stability and expansion of the democratic project has been a 
major issue in the international community since the end of the Cold 
War. Yet, how and why democratic institutions, practices and values 
become entrenched and accepted remain difficult questions to answer. 
Indeed, there is far from consensus in the field of study about an 
adequate explanation of democratization. The contested nature of the 
subject of inquiry arises in no small part from two approaches broadly 
framing the analysis of democratization, namely structural and actor-
centric. Each approach influences assumptions made, interpretations 
applied and conclusions reached about democratization. This in turn 
generates different views about the process that often leads to 
disagreement.  
 
Significantly, as ideas of linear causation and conceptual closure stretch 
to their limits, this binomial of structure and agency creates a bit of a 
causal paradox. Firstly, experience tells us that neither structure nor a 
free-play of unconstrained political agency predetermines democratic 
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change in exclusivity. Secondly, the process is far more ambiguous in 
terms of institutional outcomes than either approach presumes. This is 
something evidenced by the unexpected patterns of institutional 
transformation and distinct trade-offs that have occurred over the years 
(Munck 1993, 475-98; Whitehead 2002, 2-3). It seems that the causal 
narratives of these two approaches both find it difficult to grasp 
ambiguous change. Indeed, the protean nature of democratization 
leaves them sitting somewhat uncomfortably with the actuality of recent 
post-authoritarian settlements.  
  
One of the challenges facing researchers of democratization is to 
reconcile the analytic tension between paradigmatic assumptions and 
ambiguous advances. The following article addresses this tension. 
Firstly, by examining the major schools of thought on transition and 
consolidation, it locates key epistemological and methodological clues in 
the extant literature. Secondly, equipped with these coordinates, the 
article proceeds to outline a conceptual framework for mapping 
ambiguous post-authoritarian settlements in the study of 
democratization.   
 
Conceptual travails for a common purpose   
Even though democracy takes many different forms, more and more 
nations are turning toward some form of popular government. For 
example, despite clear differences between the institutional 
arrangements and practices of say Costa Rica, Estonia or Ghana, all are 
democratic. This is where it gets interesting because democratization, 
whether at the political or social level, is multi-layered and complex. As 
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996, 5-14) argue, if democracy is to 
become the “only game in town” then change has to occur on the 
behavioural, attitudinal and constitutional levels. This obviously means 
more than just elections. Having said this, institutional developments do 
need to take place in both political and civil society before democratic 
practices and values become entrenched and accepted. Not only does 
this present a major challenge in practical terms but also without 
detailed conceptual articulation, we run the risk of applying excessive 
universalism to a manifold phenomenon. 
  
We, therefore, need to work out what democratization is and is not. It is 
worth remembering that democracy is not the equivalent of 
democratization. Democracy specifies the manner of interaction between 
state and society but democratization denotes the process of political 
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development that changes a prior authoritarian regime and 
institutionalises a democratic political system. This distinction may seem 
theoretically pedantic but it carries considerable implications. As 
Barbara Geddes (1990, 131-50) notes, whatever we believe to be 
constitutive components of democracy will determine, in certain 
respects, our thinking about how a political system democratizes 
because these components are the ones that need to be present for us to 
categorize a regime as a democracy. What we have here is a recipe for 
confusion and contestation about the causes and consequences of 
democratization (Collier and Levitsky 1997, 430-45).   
 
On an institutional level at least, there is difference between a political 
system and the process of establishing that system. Normative ideas of 
democracy may help define political systems that policy-makers seek to 
establish but this tells us little about what we need to know to establish 
those systems. To do that we need to focus on dynamics and how 
democratic institutionalization works, i.e. the process of establishing a 
political system. This is because human actors who shape matters in 
particular settings are the ones who turn structural factors into political 
resources for change (Kim, Liddle and Said 2006, 247). It is through their 
efforts to bring about institutional reform that an organizational context 
exists with the potential to cultivate different behaviour and promote 
more representative and competitive politics. The establishment of an 
institutionalized democratic process, therefore, requires political 
decisions on, amongst other things, new constitutional arrangements, 
the rules of future political competition, and the dismantling of the 
structures of authoritarian rule. In these terms, as Adam Przeworski 
(1991, 26) notes, our concern should focus on the process by which 
relevant political actors find how best to continue to submit their 
interests and values to the uncertain interplay of democratic institutions.  
 
Having said this, there is no direct, unmediated or irreversible shift from 
regime A to regime B. There is always the possibility that political actors 
will favour certain interests and familiar arrangements. The decisions 
made by political actors during democratization are not without 
baggage. A connection exists between preferences, capacities and the 
conditions in which they appeared. In other words, the context within 
which a transition takes place is a significant part of future 
developments.  
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Add on the fact that a chain of events can also alter a country’s dynamics 
of change and the prospect of finding a one-size-fits-all theory of 
democratization is unlikely. As Laurence Whitehead (2002, 2-3) rightly 
notes, democratization resists the attention of a single paradigmatic lens. 
This is in large part due to the high levels of uncertainty and 
indeterminacy associated with the process (Mainwaring et al 1992, 332). 
To elaborate: democratization necessarily involves new actors, rules, 
practices and perhaps even new values and resources but not everything 
changes when a polity shifts into the process. That is to say, 
democratization does not unfold in a vacuum. Countries that enter a 
process of democratization already vary on the institutional, political, 
economic and socio-cultural levels that in turn affect their dynamics of 
change. As a result, research frameworks are constantly struggling to 
deal with changing realities that in turn test received theoretical 
wisdom. With these considerations in mind, a good first step towards 
investigating this inherently indeterminate process would be to situate 
the major contributions in the field of study. 
 
Modernization school 
In the early years of this field of study, influential initial expressions 
came from the likes of Seymour Martin Lipset (1959), Walt Rostow 
(1960) and Alexander Gershenkron (1962). They drew broad correlations 
between economic development and political change. This implied a 
causal link between Western forms of development and the diffusion of 
liberal-democratic political ideals across less developed countries. An 
assumption common to these early works was that democratic 
breakthrough reflected the level of modernization in a country and the 
weakening of structural conflict. This perspective saw democratization 
as the final stage of a secular industrial urbanization dynamic. On a 
policy level, the thinking was that developing countries should adopt 
Western economic and social patterns to ensure democratic political 
development. 
 
Holding to a view of linear acculturation meant that the identification of 
pre-requisites for democracy became a key focus. Unfortunately, what 
this tended to ignore was the actuality of cultural difference and 
contingent historical experience, something that led to significantly 
different outcomes. Indeed, Samuel Huntington (1965), Dankwart 
Rustow (1970) and Robert Dahl (1971) were all quick to recognize that a 
country’s own distinctive institutions affect regime change. As 
Huntington (1965, 386-430) noted, the outcome of economic 
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development was at least as likely to be political decay, instability and 
authoritarianism. Having said this, Huntington (1991) did later argue 
that wealthier developing countries are more likely to be democratic. 
Other studies, most importantly Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, 
Jose Cheibub and Fernando Limongi (2000), suggest that socio-economic 
conditions do not prevent democratic breakthrough. The caveat being 
that once a breakthrough occurs such conditions do dramatically affect 
the quality of political democracy that establishes itself. It is reasonable 
to infer from this that transitions are unpredictable but, once achieved, 
countries can sustain them provided they achieve higher levels of GDP 
per capita with increased equitable distribution. This seems to point to 
the fact that there are a number of interrelated factors conducive to 
democratic persistence including higher rates of literacy, education, 
urbanization and an independent media.  
 
Dependency school 
The alternative perspective of the dependency school of thought cast 
doubt on the early optimism of modernization interpretations. This 
school attributed a failure to democratize in large parts of the world to 
the global capitalist system itself. For the likes of Immanuel Wallerstein 
(1974), who followed a broadly Marxian analytic tradition, the ability of 
a developed ‘core’ of Western states to exploit the cheap, unskilled 
labour and raw materials within and between ‘periphery’ and ‘semi-
periphery’ localities kept them in a state of underdevelopment. 
Similarly, Andre Gunder Frank (1967) saw this as a reason why many 
developing countries failed to enjoy the fruits of their labour despite 
decades of following Western patterns of development. As Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (1979) noted, the structure of world 
trade and foreign investment resulted in more capital outflows than 
inflows in developing countries. Nicos Poulantzas (1976) and Nicos 
Mouzelis (1986) further concluded that Western-led modernization was 
harmful rather than beneficial to political development in these 
countries. 
 
Having said this, the dependency school failed to explain why a third 
wave of democratization occurred despite the continuing peripheral 
economic status of many of the countries involved. In fact, the 
transitions in Southern Europe, Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia 
between 1974 and 2000 highlighted the dependency school’s over-
determined causality. Indeed, both modernization and dependency 
schools privilege the economic infrastructure as determining political 
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outcomes. Yet, the work of Barrington Moore (1966) and Dankwart 
Rustow (1970) demonstrates that the arbitrariness of economic 
preconditions makes it impossible to generalize them across all cases.  
 
Bureaucratic authoritarian school  
As a palliative to structural over-determinism, Huntington’s (1968) work 
on praetorian political orders provided the groundwork to go beyond 
the explanatory rubric of preconditions. As Huntington (1968, 1-39) 
argued, political institutional developments were significant factors in 
explaining a lack of democratic development and authoritarian 
persistence. His work on the “isolated state” as a self-interested, 
autonomous actor had considerable explanatory appeal in the Southeast 
Asian context, where military coalitions perennially gained control of 
the government apparatus. Indeed, you could view these countries as 
bureaucratic authoritarian regimes because military and civil service 
elites tapped into economic resources to service the state and their own 
interests.  
 
For Guillermo O’Donnell (1973, 6-8) modernising elites ensured the rise 
of bureaucratic authoritarianism to protect their own interests and those 
of Western capital. This was a crucial factor in stalling democracy and 
promoting authoritarianism in Brazil after 1964 and Argentina after 
1966. In the latter cases, technocratic experts gave operational expression 
to the broad exclusionist practices of their military patrons. Similarly, for 
Mochtar Mas’Oed (1989) this matched the dynamics of authoritarian 
persistence in Indonesia in the late 1980s. By the 1990s, however, the 
bureaucratic authoritarian school of thought no longer seemed to 
capture the intricacies of societies experiencing rapid growth and social 
change.  
 
Strategic choice school 
From the 1970s onwards, in an attempt to bridge the dilemma of 
structural determinism, theorists began to explore political agency lines 
of inquiry. Rustow (1970, 337-63) questioned the earlier work of the 
modernization school that suggested a consensus on civic culture or 
certain levels of economic development were prerequisites. He 
recognised that these were more likely the results of democracy rather 
than its causes. For Rustow, successful democratization rested on a 
gradual process of compromise. He understood that human agency 
affects this dynamic. Indeed, the handiwork of politicians skilled in 
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bargaining techniques could create a pattern of compromise in the 
developmental process and facilitate transition.  
  
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1978), following on from Rustow, opened 
this new path further. Linz and Stepan (1978, 1-5) emphasised a more 
process-oriented perspective in their account of authoritarianism and 
democratic breakdown. Likewise, in their seminal four-volume work, 
Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead 
(1986, 71) adopted a strongly actor-orientated focus. This was because 
for them it was neither logically or historically possible to prove a 
structurally determined causal relationship between economic 
development and political change. From this perspective, stable 
democratic outcomes depended less on structural factors and more on 
the strategic interactions of principal actors involved during the 
transition (O’Donnell et al 1986, 27-29). What we have here is a 
significant shift from a political economy of social conflict to explain 
change and towards an analysis grounded in human agency, in 
particular that of elite political action. As such, it highlighted the 
hitherto unexplored link between the strategic interactions of political 
elites and democratic transition.  
 
In doing so, they were able to draw distinctions between different types 
of authoritarianism and different types of transition. This highlighted 
that authoritarianism in Southern Europe was more the product of right 
wing political coalitions. As a form of dicta blanda (soft autocracy), it 
differed from the dicta dura (hard autocracy) of say Argentina. In Spain, 
for example, the ruling party played a subsidiary role to the ruling class 
coalition. When they became an obstruction to coalition interests, the 
friability of authoritarian arrangements became all too apparent. This 
led to schisms between regime ‘hard-liners’ (duros) and ‘soft-liners’ 
(blandos) (O’Donnell et al 1986, 19). In Spain, Portugal and Greece, the 
crumbling of consensus created internal crisis and the opportunity for a 
conditional democratic compromise (O’Donnell et al 1986, 27). In these 
terms, the negotiated pacts between political elites rather than any 
structural preconditions were crucial for the success or failure of 
transitions.  
 
For O’Donnell et al (1986, 73) negotiations can also take different forms 
depending on the relative strength of the actors involved. A ruptura 
pactada can occur where there is a lack of political continuity with the 
prior regime. Alternatively, a reforma pactada can occur where there is an 
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element of legal continuity with the prior regime, e.g. the 1977 Pact of 
Moncloa in Spain between government, parliament and trade unions. 
O’Donnell et al (1986, 74) saw this as a template for a successful and 
stable transition. Either way, it is clear that the type of pact negotiated is 
crucial to the resultant post-authoritarian outcome. As Giuseppe Di 
Palma (1990) underlined, pacts bring stability as they allow the 
possibility of democratic co-existence. For Di Palma, establishing 
democracy was, in the main, a matter of proper crafting. From this 
perspective, if elite political actors commit to political change then 
democracy can be possible despite adverse structural conditions.  
 
Path dependency school  
In the early 1990s, path dependency emerged as a significant school of 
thought in the literature. Its central premise for studying 
democratization is that proximity to events of the day leads to a loss of 
perspective. Scholars like Ruth and David Collier (1991), Douglass C. 
North (1990) John Mahoney (2000) and Paul Pierson (2000) all 
introduced more diachronic perspectives into their work. Their work 
links the immediate catalysts of political instability with long-term 
factors of regime instability. This highlights the embedded nature of 
contingent transition phenomena in broader social dynamics. From a 
path dependency perspective, transitions are part of longer historical 
processes. In terms of democratization, critical junctures in a country’s 
historical and institutional development shape its political arena. This in 
turn affects the prospects of political stability and future regime 
dynamics because historical and institutional junctures can trigger self-
reinforcing feedback in a political system. That is to say, different 
historical contingencies can constrain and/or enable the choices political 
actors make and lead to different democratization paths. As such, a 
regime’s historical antecedents provide important clues to the 
underlying forces at play both internally and externally in a particular 
setting.  
 
Notably, continuity from a previous regime -and the kind and degree of 
political institutionalization- may lead different polities to produce 
different responses to similar sets of exigencies. Although links to pre-
existing structures are neither straightforward nor specific across cases, 
a temporal sequence of events and processes shapes the political arena 
and influences the kind of democracy established. One cannot simply 
assume that political elites will ‘choose’ democracy as the most rational 
option. Political actors have to make choices but historical, cultural and 
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economic legacies constitute a context within which they must operate. 
That is to say, even with the advent of new institutional reform, 
underlying societal conventions, cultural practices and authoritarian 
legacies can restrict, enhance or predispose specific options. This in turn 
can produce distinct trade-offs and unexpected patterns of 
transformation and modification.  
 
The path dependency school does more than fit appropriate cases into a 
modal pattern. By introducing an analytically coherent account of 
history, timing and sequence in a non-deterministic manner, it shows 
how the feedback of economic context, historical structure and political 
choices affects a country’s democratization path. This provides a counter 
to some common misapprehensions by highlighting that differences are 
often too wide-ranging to generalize across the board. As we know, to 
paraphrase Kant, outcomes from the crooked timber of human activity 
are rarely straightforward.  
 
To elaborate: when countries have different political institutionalization, 
socio-cultural heritage or economic fundamentals thinking that they can 
achieve democracy in a manner that fully conforms to an abstract 
democratic norm is as an unreasonable expectation. There are stark 
differences between the preceding regimes of say Eastern Europe and 
those of Latin America, Southern Europe or Southeast Asia. State 
socialist regimes were different in relation to structure, ideology, 
political economy, civil-military relations and position in the 
international system than other democratizers. State, nation and identity 
were at the very centre of the transitions in Eastern Europe. Their 
change was simultaneously political and economic, whilst in Latin 
America and Southern Europe the transformations were much more 
political in nature, with East and Southeast Asia falling somewhere in 
between. What this indicates is that to learn more about the nature of 
democratization these differences demand detailed explication  
 
What is democratic transition and consolidation? 
What these major schools of thought highlight is simultaneously a 
contested field of study but one with common ground. Despite their 
differences, the schools readily agree that understanding the 
relationship between key stages of democratization -namely democratic 
transition and democratic consolidation- is crucial to understanding a 
country’s overall process of democratization. They also agree that clear 
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articulation of these two different but interrelated phases is a far from 
straightforward task.  
 
Firstly, democratic transition is a temporal phase of rapid change that 
can vary in length and uncertainty (Linz 1978, 30-35). In the broadest 
sense, it begins with the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and ends 
with the initial establishment of some sort of democratic structures. Of 
course, a liberal democratic outcome is far from a guarantee, as the rules 
of the political game are still very much up for grabs. We know the point 
of departure, authoritarianism, but there is no way of knowing a priori 
the point of arrival. Indeed, a democratic transition can be suspended, 
wound back or stalled as politicians struggle to define future rules and 
procedures (O’Donnell et al 1986, 6).  
 
In an illuminating view, Valerie Bunce (2000, 707) defines the macro-
political trajectory of transition as a leap from “uncertain procedures 
and certain results” to “certain procedures and uncertain outcomes.” 
What we have here is a gap of uncertainty between the breakdown of 
the previous regime (the entry into uncertainty) and the installation of a 
new regime (the exit from uncertain procedures to certain ones with 
uncertain outcomes). This is a fluid phase of opportunity and risk. In 
these terms, it would be naïve to assume that democracy arises merely 
from the breakdown of the prior authoritarian regime. There is a protean 
quality to the new institutional structures because residue from the old 
regime still exists. Moreover, the actual mode of transition can also 
influence future developments, i.e. transition by collapse (Greece and 
Portugal 1974,) transfer of power (Bolivia 1978-1980,) or negotiated 
regime-dominated transition (Spain 1974-1975 and Brazil 1978-1979.) 
Having said this, Munck (1994, 355-75) does seem to identify a common 
thread between the relative strength of actors involved, the subsequent 
strategies they adopt and the impact this has on consequences.  
 
Secondly, the factors affecting democratic consolidation often differ 
from that of transition. So whilst establishing institutional arrangements 
is one thing, sustaining them over time without their reversal is quite 
another. Consolidation involves not only the survival of a political 
democracy but also an element of sustainability. Famously, Juan Linz 
(1990, 153) identified this as the requirement for democracy to become 
the “only game in town.” As Gunther et al (1996, 168) also noted, a 
democracy achieves consolidation, “when all politically significant 
groups regard its key political institutions as the only legitimate 
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framework for political contestation, and adhere to democratic rules of 
the game.” Likewise, for Adam Przeworski (1992, 26), democratic 
consolidation takes place “when all relevant political forces find it best 
to continue to submit their interests and values to the uncertain 
interplay of institutions.” It would seem that consolidation involves a 
greater passage of time as the new set of rules for the political game are 
constructed and institutionalized. Institutionalization is, clearly, a more 
important aspect of consolidation than transition. 
 
Having said this, some scholars questioned the definitional closure 
implied by the use of the term consolidation. They urged us to remain 
cautious about “attaching the term ‘consolidated’ to something that will 
probably though not certainly endure.” (O’Donnell 1996, 38) In fact, the 
closure we ascribe to our definition depends, in large part, on what 
point of the authoritarianism/developed democracy continuum we as 
observers choose to place ourselves. As Don Chull Shin (1994) and 
Guillermo O’Donnell (1996) both note, there is either explicitly or 
implicitly a requirement for a high degree of institutionalization and the 
establishment of formal procedural rules. O’Donnell (1996, 39) went on 
to argue that:  
 
“This produces a tendency to push the conception of democracy in 
discussion of democratic consolidation towards an ideal, well-structured 
and comprehensive institutional system that can hardly be obtained, 
otherwise no regime is truly consolidated for the lack of an ingredient 
deemed essential and it is impossible to assign a reasonable closure to 
the second transition.”  
 
Indeed, John Markoff (1997, 68) echoes this sentiment, by noting that, 
“democracy is not a fixed entity, to be consolidated, but an invitation for 
further transformation, perhaps deepening and perhaps trivializing.” To 
elaborate: there is little doubt that there is overlap between the 
consolidation phase and the uncertainties and insecurities of the 
transition period but conditions that facilitate transition do not 
necessarily overlap with those that make democratic consolidation 
likely. Importantly, consolidation involves legitimisation at both the elite 
and popular level. This makes it qualitatively different on the political, 
economic and civil society level (Pridham 1990, 103-117). To equate the 
breakdown of an authoritarian regime with a successful consolidation of 
democracy is a somewhat sanguine attitude to adopt. There is no simple 
linear progression from former to latter. It may be one thing to establish 
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democratic electoral arrangements but sustaining them over time 
without their reversal is quite another. In extreme cases, extensive 
inherited constraints can even freeze the dynamics of change. That is to 
say, regime change can stall in a semi-authoritarian or oligarchic 
condition. Countries like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Nigeria and 
Turkmenistan have all struggled with the enormous complexity of 
democratization. They have tended to drift in a ‘protractedly 
unconsolidated’ state, unable to transform basic socio-economic 
orientations.  
 
Nonetheless, there are a number of commonly agreed upon features. For 
instance, effective consolidations appear to have the following features- 
popular legitimation; the stabilization of electoral rules; judicial reform; 
the diffusion of democratic values; the marginalization of anti-system 
actors; civilian rule over the military; the removal of reserved 
authoritarian domains; party system development; the routinization of 
politics and stabilization of the economy (Schedler 1998, 91-92). As 
Huntington (1991, 263) rightly points out, such developments take time, 
i.e. at least two successful elections and one transfer of power from 
incumbent to opposition.  
 
What we do know from the extensive body of work on democratization 
is that transition and consolidation are difficult concepts to define and 
even harder to put into practice. Ad-hoc or informal types of 
institutionalization may or may not settle, overtime, into more referable 
institutional arrangements. In fact, for many countries consolidation is 
more an ex post facto realisation than a set of criteria. On a more 
positive note, however, over the last 30 years there have been numerous 
consolidations. Having said this, a good grip on the dynamics of 
successful regime change does remain decidedly elusive.  
 
A framework for mapping institutional ambiguity  
Clearly, the extant literature contains considerable strengths and many 
investigations shine bright light on the dynamics of democratization. In 
fact, there seems little advantage in viewing different schools of thought 
pejoratively because they all contribute, in an intelligent manner, to the 
common search for answers. Nonetheless, certain blind spots do remain 
in our understanding of democratization.  
 
On the one hand, structural approaches tend to focus on impersonal 
forces such as technological innovation, the spread of market-based 
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social relations and the emergence of new social identities as the driving 
forces behind democratization. We can see that a structurally influenced 
interpretation is excellent for identifying important economic and 
institutional developments of regime change but also tends to be over-
determined in terms of that structure. But, it struggles to link, in a 
convincing manner, regime change dynamics with the agency of 
democratic transitions.  
 
On the other hand, actor-orientated approaches view political choice as 
a crucial factor in democratic transitions and, therefore, tend to focus on 
decisions taken at crucial stages by leading political actors. We can see 
that the influence of the latter approach may bring human agency to the 
fore but it also struggles to explain contingent socio-historical factors 
that shape actors’ choices. As Gerardo Munck (1994, 360) notes, 
exclusive focus on political elite interaction runs the risk of screening out 
broader social factors involved in conditioning political change.  
 
Similarly, when we downplay historical contingency we are tempted 
into accepting a form of political voluntarism (Bunce 1995, 124). In other 
words, our chain of causality becomes too reliant on the subjective 
choices of key actors and leaves long-term factors of political instability 
under-conceptualized. This is despite the fact that historically 
constituted structures can both enable and constrain the range of options 
available to decision-makers. It seems naïve to think that things change 
in a free-play of unimpeded political-agency. In other words, context is 
clearly important to future developments. Something brought into stark 
relief by the anomalous character of democratization in post-
Communist, East and Southeast Asian countries (Bunce 2000, 703-734).  
 
What this indicates is that the establishment of democracy involves 
generative factors beyond the rational capacity of elites to bargain about 
clear-cut choices. The preferences and capacities of individuals embody 
a historical context that may predispose specific options. Rather than 
democratization being direct and unmediated, variations of time and 
context create the possibility of different paths in particular settings. As 
a result, modes of transition may appear similar but subtle variations 
can create large differences in outcome.  
 
In sociological terms, what we begin to appreciate is that 
democratization is a constantly changing phenomenon in terms of time 
and context. Achieving democracy is, therefore, not a predetermined 
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end-state, but a long-term and somewhat open-ended outcome 
(Whitehead 2002, 3). However, one can still unwittingly adopt a 
“retrospective determinism” (assuming what did happen is what had to 
happen) or even worse, “presentism” (considering the motives and 
perceptions of the past are the same as those of the present). If we are to 
appreciate the dynamics of change, it is necessary to grasp that the 
contexts of regime instability within which actors deploy statecraft 
involve different notions of state, nation and identity. These political 
actors are not operating from a tabula rasa projecting the most feasible 
solutions (Kirchheimer 1965, 964-974). The past developmental patterns 
and underlying societal conventions that they confront influence the 
emergence of distinct trade-offs and unexpected institutional 
transformations. In fact, it is probably fairer to say that the politics of 
pragmatic democratic change more often than not serve the interests of 
established elites. Having said this, a constructive grammar of political 
action can transform structural context into political resources for 
institutional change. As a process of negotiation, this does not lead to a 
predetermined end-state but rather political actors utilise a polity’s 
language of self-understanding to imagine and reconstitute 
disarticulated political space. In a very Aristotelian sense, we actually 
realise that political activity is what constitutes stable futures from 
troubled pasts. 
 
Nonetheless, to make this observation raises considerable issues. What it 
speaks to is the notion that social structures are not independent of the 
values and practices they govern. The preferences and capacities of 
political actors do not exist independently from the conditions in which 
they appeared. Merely to state this brings complex analytic 
considerations to the fore. To draw briefly on the work of Henri 
Lefebvre (1991, 1-10), this involves considerations about the space 
within which change occurs, how political actors’ draw upon, re-invent 
or transform traditional identifications and how others involved might 
interpret what occurs. Indeed, the manner in which political actors 
remember, imagine, or transform their roles has to appeal and respond 
to a mass audience accustomed to viewing politics through extant socio-
cultural-historic lenses. This means that the interplay between an 
evolving grammar of political action and structural context can both 
constrain and enable the re-articulation of political space. Although new 
political space opens and new audiences emerge, the space and audience 
operate within a symbolic context that is already present and located at 
the level of the polity’s relationship to itself. The decisions made during 
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democratization are, therefore, not necessarily rational in the strictest 
sense but are more an adaptation to changing political space. Our 
ontological categorization, therefore, can no longer remain a binary 
dualism between structure and agency but must move towards a 
relational one. Thinking in terms of binary dualism is a false dichotomy. 
Indeed, the difficulty in separating social fact from social value calls for 
a different approach to the subject of inquiry. Rather than ascribe to 
overly paradigmatic attitudes, one should adopt a more integrative 
focus (Pridham 2000, 5-38). Keeping an open sensibility to our inquiries 
will allow us to synthesize in a rigorous manner a plurality of 
approaches. This in turn opens potential ways to understand ambiguous 
regime change dynamics and unravel the interplay between political 
action and context in post-authoritarian settings.  
 
Framing democratization as a political renegotiation of history, culture 
and identity is an important step for such an approach to work. By 
giving democratization an implicitly non-linear construction, it provides 
a framework for mapping what is a complex process. This allows us to 
grasp that change occurs through time by way of contestation, 
destabilisation and differentiation. Placing uncertainty at the very heart 
of democratization also lends analytic coherency to the endeavour 
because we open up the possibility of learning from the experience of 
other countries. In fact, it may end up being the most pragmatic route 
for mapping unplanned effects and outcomes in the study of 
democratization.  
 
Conclusion  
Evidently, countries do not emerge in straightforward transitions from 
authoritarianism to multi-party democracy. There are often unexpected 
patterns of modification and transformation as political arenas undergo 
alteration and reconstitution. This sets us a number of challenges. On the 
one hand, pragmatic decision making and compromise stabilise an 
uncertain process. On the other, there is little doubt that things do not 
pan out in an unimpeded play of political agency. A county’s societal 
conventions, cultural practices and developmental legacies shape its 
post-authoritarian settlement. What these two facets of democratization 
indicate is that institutional outcomes are a complex interplay between 
political agency and context.  
 
The pattern of democratic politics that eventually emerges in a 
particular setting is, therefore, a reiterative interplay between its own 
 411 
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culture and politics and the discourse and practice that enacts it. This 
process both reflects and constructs a polity’s own specificity in a non-
linear manner because it oscillates between uncertainty, continuity and 
change. In common with most renegotiations, ambiguity becomes to 
democratization, as push is to shove. In fact, there are no simple 
categorizations, but rather matters of time and degree. 
  
In these terms, the introduction of more fine-grained readings of the 
relationship between democratization, agency and contextual narratives 
of history, culture and identity is a useful step to take in unravelling the 
ambiguity of recent post authoritarian settlements. 
 
 
Bibliography 
Bermeo, Nancy. 1990. Rethinking Regime Change. Comparative Politics. 
22,3:359-77. 
Bermeo, Nancy. 1997. Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict 
during Democratic Transitions. Comparative Politics 29,3: 305-22. 
Bunce, Valerie. 1995. Should Transitologists Be Grounded? Slavic 
Review. 54,1:   111-127. 
Bunce, Valerie. 2000. Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded 
Generalizations. Comparative Political Studies. 33,6-7: 703-34. 
Cardoso, Fernando H., and Enzo Faletto. 1979. Dependency and 
Development in Latin America. Berkley: University of California 
Press  
Carothers, Thomas.2002. The End of the Transition Paradigm. Journal of 
Democracy 13,1: 5-21. 
Collier, David and Steven Levitsky. 1997. Democracy with Adjectives: 
Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research. World Politics. 
49,3: 420-51. 
Collier, Ruth B., and D. Collier. 1991. Shaping the Political Arena: 
Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics 
in Latin America. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press. 
Dahl, Robert.1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
Di Palma, Giuseppe. 1990. To Craft Democracies: An Essay on 
Democratic Transitions. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 412
euroPOLIS 5/2009 
 
Ethier, Diane., ed. 1990. Democratic Transition and Consolidation in 
Southern Europe, Latin America and South East Asia. 
Basingstoke: MacMillan Press. 
Geddes, Barbara. 1990. How the Cases you choose affect the answers 
you get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics. Political Analysis. 
2,1: 131-150. 
Geddes, Barbara. 1994. Politician’s Dilemma: Building State Capacity in 
Latin America. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Geddes, Barbara. 1999.What Do We Know About Democratization After 
Twenty Years? Annual Review of Political Science. 2: 115-144. 
Gerschenkron, Alexander. 1962. Economic Backwardness in Historical 
Perspective: A Book of Essays. New York: Praeger. 
Gunder Frank, Andre. 1967. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin 
America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil. New York: 
Monthly Review Press. 
Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the 
late Twentieth Century. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma 
Press. 
Karl, Terry L. 1990. Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America. 
Comparative Politics. 23,1: 1-23.  
Karl, Terry L., and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1991. Modes of Transition in 
Latin America and Eastern Europe. International Social Science 
Journal, 43, 128: 269-284. 
Kim, Yong C., R. William Liddle and Salim Said. 2006. Political 
Leadership and Civilian Supremacy in Third Wave Democracies: 
Comparing South Korea and Indonesia. Pacific Affairs. 79,2: 247-
268. 
Kirchheimer, Otto. 1965. Confining Conditions and Revolutionary 
Breakthroughs. American Political Science Review. 59,4: 964-974. 
Kitschelt, Herbert.1992. Political Regime Change: Structure and Process 
Driven Explanations? American Political Science Review, 86,4: 
1028-1034. 
Lefebvre, Henri. 1991. The Production of Space. Trans. Donald 
Nicholson-Smith. London: Blackwell Publishing. 
Linz, Juan J., 1990. Transitions to Democracy. Washington Monthly. 2,2: 
12-34. 
 413 
euroPOLIS 5/2009 
Linz, Juan J., and A. C. Stepan. 1978. The Breakdown of Democratic 
Regimes. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Linz Juan, J., and A.C. Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition 
and Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.  
Lipset, Seymour M. 1959. Some Social Requisites of Democracy: 
Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. American 
Political Science Review, 53,1: 69-105. 
Mahoney, John. 2000. Path Dependence in Historical Sociology. Theory 
and Society. 29,4: 507-548 
Mainwaring, Scott, Guillermo A. O’Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela. 
eds. 1992. Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South 
American Democracies in Comparative Perspective. South Bend: 
University of Notre Dame Press. 
Markoff, John. 1997. Really Existing Democracy: Learning from Latin 
America in the Late 1990s. New Left Review. 223: 48-68. 
Moore, Barrington. 1966. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: 
Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Boston: 
Beacon. 
Mouzelis, Nicos. 1986. Politics of the Semi-Periphery. London: McMillan 
Publishers Ltd. 
Munck, Geraldo. 1993. Between Theory and History and Beyond 
Traditional Area Studies: A New Comparative Perspective on 
Latin America. Comparative Politics, 25, 4: 475-98. 
Munck, Geraldo. 1994. Democratic Transitions in Comparative 
Perspective. Comparative Politics. 26,3: 355-75. 
O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1973. Modernization and Bureaucratic 
Authoritarianism. Berkeley: Berkeley Institute of International 
Studies. 
O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1996. Illusions about Consolidation. Journal of 
Democracy. 7, 2: 34-51. 
O’Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead. 
eds. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Four Volumes. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Ottoway, Marina. 2003. Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-
Authoritarianism. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Foundation. 
Pierson, Paul. 2000. Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the 
Study of Politics. American Political Science Review. 94, 2: 251-
267. 
 414
euroPOLIS 5/2009 
 
Poulantzas, Nicos. The Crisis of the Dictatorships: Portugal, Greece, 
Spain. London: New Left Books, Humanities Press. 
Pridham, Geoffrey. 1990. Political Actors, Linkages and Interactions: 
Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe. West European 
Politics. 13,4: 103-117. 
Pridham, Geoffrey. 2000. The Dynamics of Democratization: A 
Comparative Approach. London/NewYork: Continuum. 
Przeworski, Adam. 1985. Capitalism and Social Democracy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market: Political and 
Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Przeworski, Adam. ed. 2000. Democracy and Development. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Przeworski, Adam, M. M. Alvarez, J. A. Cheibub and F. Limongi. 2002. 
Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-
Being in the World, 1950-1990. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Rustow, Dankwart. 1970. Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic 
Model. Comparative Politics. 2, 3: 337-63. 
Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1974. The Modern World-System, vol. I: 
Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-
Economy in the Sixteenth Century. Studies in Social 
Discontinuity Series, New York: Academic Press.  
Whitehead, Laurence. 2002. Democratization: Theory and Experience. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
 
 
 
 415 
